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use#LAABURDENS OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
BRUCE L. HAY and KATHRYN E. SPIER*
Abstract
Burden of proof rules, which require a speciﬁed party to produce evidence on a
contested issue, are central to the adversary system. In this article, we model burden
of proof rules as a device for minimizing the costs of litigation. The central point
to emerge from the model is that, properly assigned, a burden of proof rule econo-
mizes on the transmission of information to the court. We use the model to explain
characteristic practices of courts in assigning the burden of proof.
I. Introduction
Adversary systems of justice typically give the parties (not the judge)
the task of adducing evidence on contested issues in litigation.1 Such a pol-
icy immediately raises the problem of dividing that task between the par-
ties. Who, as between plaintiff and defendant, should be given the job of
producing evidence on a contested issue? Burden of proof rules are the de-
vice courts employ to address this problem. By giving a speciﬁed party the
burden of proof on a given issue, the court tells that party that he must ei-
ther come up with evidence supporting his position or suffer an adverse
judgment on that issue.
In this article we develop an economic analysis of the assignment of bur-
dens of proof in civil litigation. Our principal claim is that courts can use
the burden of proof to limit the costs of resolving a dispute. More precisely,
we argue that the burden of proof, by giving one party the task of producing
evidence, relieves his opponent to some extent of that task—thereby saving
expenditures that might otherwise be incurred by the opponent. Optimally
used, the burden of proof may minimize the expenditures devoted to gather-
* Bruce L. Hay is Assistant Professor at Harvard Law School. Kathryn E. Spier is Associ-
ate Professor, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. Earlier versions of
this article were presented at workshops at Harvard, Chicago, Michigan, and Stanford. We
thank Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell, Bernard Wolfman, and the workshop participants for
their comments.
1 This is, as Wigmore observed, a characteristic feature of Anglo-American legal systems.
See John H. Wigmore, 9 Wigmore on Evidence 276 (Chadbourn rev 1970).
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ing, presenting and processing information in litigation. This rationale, we
suggest, is consistent with the observed practices of court in making the
burden of proof assignment.
To make these points, we use a simple model of litigation in which the
parties decide strategically whether to present evidence, given the burden
of proof rule selected by the court. The court’s problem in the model is to
choose the burden of proof that minimizes the costs of litigation. Section II
of this article introduces the model and speciﬁes the court’s problem. Sec-
tion III examines how, in the model, the parties will behave under alterna-
tive burden of proof assignments. Building on these results, Section IV
identiﬁes the optimal burden of proof assignment and the factors on which
it turns. Section V considers the extent to which the model holds up as a
positive theory of how courts assign the burden of proof in practice. Section
VI concludes.
II. The Problem
A. Two Types of Decision Rule
Consider a lawsuit in which a contested issue is whether some event X
occurred; the plaintiff says X occurred, the defendant says it did not (X
might be, for example, an act of negligence by the defendant). The govern-
ing substantive law, we may assume, holds that the defendant’s liability to
the plaintiff depends on whether X in fact occurred.
Taken alone, that substantive rule is not enough to decide cases such as
this, in which the parties make conﬂicting assertions. The court also needs
a rule instructing it on what to do when it is uncertain whether X occurred.
Two possible components of such a rule are worth distinguishing.
Level of Conﬁdence. A level of conﬁdence rule (or ‘‘standard of
proof’’) is a principle specifying how certain the court must be of a fact to
accept it. In abstract terms, such a rule would specify a threshold of T per-
cent: if the court believes the probability that X occurred exceeds T, it ﬁnds
for the plaintiff on the issue and otherwise ﬁnds for the defendant. Stan-
dards of proof such as ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’’ ‘‘clear and convinc-
ing evidence,’’ and ‘‘preponderance of the evidence’’ represent different
possible choices of a value for T.
2
Burden of Proof. In an adversary system, the court generally cannot
2 As we have formulated it, the rule specifying T incorporates the so-called burden of per-
suasion—a principle for decision in cases where the trier of fact is in equipoise—in civil
cases. If, for example, T . 50 percent, then the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion, in the
sense that the defendant wins if the court thinks X is equally likely to have happened or not
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conduct its own search for information concerning X’s occurrence; it must
wait to see what evidence the parties present. The function of a burden of
proof rule is to apportion the task of presenting evidence. In effect, a burden
of proof rule requires one party to produce evidence sufﬁcient to convince
the court (to the required level of conﬁdence) of his position. Thus, if the
plaintiff has the burden of proof, he loses if no evidence is introduced that
X occurred; if the defendant has the burden of proof, he loses unless evi-
dence is introduced that X did not occur.
Now, the distinction between a rule indicating the required level of con-
ﬁdence and a rule indicating a burden of proof is of course blurry.
3 (As we
use the term, ‘‘burden of proof’’ corresponds to the so-called burden of
production commonly encountered in textbooks.)
4 For our purposes, the im-
portant line of demarcation is that a burden of proof rule—as we use the
term here—speciﬁes who must present evidence to the court.5 It is important
to see that this question is not the same as asking how certain the court
must be of X before concluding it occurred.
This may not be obvious. It might be thought that a rule indicating the
required level of conﬁdence necessarily implies a corresponding burden of
proof. The line of reasoning would go as follows: if the threshold T for
imposing liability is greater than 50 percent, then this must mean the court
must rule in the defendant’s favor if no evidence is introduced (in other
words, the plaintiff has the burden of proof). That is because, if no evidence
is introduced, the court must conclude the parties’ positions are equally
likely to be true, in which case (since T . .5) the defendant must win.
6
To see the error in this reasoning, consider the follow example. Suppose
that both parties have access to evidence giving a perfectly accurate signal
of whether X occurred;
7 suppose both parties know what the evidence con-
tains; and suppose that both parties believe (for whatever reason) that if no
evidence is introduced, the court will rule for the plaintiff. Suppose, ﬁnally,
3 Deciding how much evidence is necessary to discharge a party’s burden of proof is simi-
lar, if not identical, to deciding what level of conﬁdence the court should have before impos-
ing sanctions.
4 In contrast, the burden of persuasion is included in the rule specifying the required level
of conﬁdence. See note 2 above. For a discussion of the burdens of persuasion and produc-
tion, see Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure
337-43 (4th ed 1992).
5 An inquisitorial system in its pure theoretical form—which gives the court the task of
gathering evidence—would not have a burden of proof as we have described it. An inquisito-
rial system would, however, need to specify the required level of conﬁdence necessary to
conclude that X occurred.
6 Similarly, if T is less than 50 percent, then this must mean the court must rule in the
plaintiff’s favor if no evidence is introduced (so the defendant bears the burden of proof).
7 Say, a videotape whose authenticity is undisputed.416 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
that the court knows all this (but does not know what the contents of the
evidence is). Then, if the court sees no evidence introduced, it should con-
clude that X occurred: for if the evidence showed otherwise, the defendant
would have introduced it.
The important thing to see in this example is that it makes no difference
what level of conﬁdence is required: T can be 1 percent or 99 percent; the
analysis is the same no matter what its value. So long as the court knows
the defendant could have introduced perfectly reliable evidence of his care
but chose not to, it can conclude the defendant was negligent. In short, the
value of T does not imply who should lose in the event no evidence is intro-
duced.
This example is obviously stylized, but its point holds more broadly: the
choice of a burden of proof is logically independent of the choice of a rule
specifying the required level of conﬁdence. The simple reason for this is
that the parties decide strategically whether to introduce evidence, based on
what they expect the court to do if no evidence is introduced. Given the
parties’ beliefs in the above example, it is perfectly coherent for the court
to put the burden of proof on the defendant even though T may be very
large; similarly, it would (if the parties had other beliefs) be coherent for
the court to put the burden of proof on the plaintiff even if T were very
small.
B. The Court’s Task
Our interest will be in the problem of choosing a burden of proof on
some issue in litigation, given some rule specifying the required level of
conﬁdence. To examine the court’s problem, we use a simple model of liti-
gation in which each party decides whether to gather, and present to the
court, evidence on the issue of negligence; the court then rules in one or
the other’s favor on that issue. (We put aside the possibility of settling out
of court.)
For clarity of exposition, we make the following set of assumptions about
the litigation: (1) Both parties have access to a body of evidence that indi-
cates (to the required level of certainty) whether the defendant acted negli-
gently, and both parties know what the evidence contains. (2) This body of
evidence is unitary in nature, so that the court sees either all of it or none
of it. (This latter assumption might be justiﬁed on the hypothesis that if one
party tries to mislead the court by a selective presentation of the evidence,
the other party furnishes the rest of the evidence.)
8 (3) A party’s cost of
8 We make this assumption because (1) it enables us to put aside level-of-conﬁdence is-
sues (how much evidence should be required?) and (2) it enables us to put aside strategic
problems associated with partial presentation of the evidence.BURDENS OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION 417
presenting the evidence is sufﬁciently low that he will present evidence on
the issue of negligence, if presenting it is necessary to secure a favorable
ruling on the issue.
III. Parties’ Behavior under Alternative Burden Assignments
As a predicate to examining the court’s problem, we begin by identifying
how the parties will act in litigation under one or the other burden of proof
assignment. Suppose the plaintiff has the burden of proof on whether X oc-
curred. Then the parties, assuming they are informed of the burden assign-
ment, will behave as follows in equilibrium:
The plaintiff presents the evidence if and only if it indicates X occurred.
The defendant presents no evidence on the question.
To see that this behavior holds (uniquely) in equilibrium, observe ﬁrst
that the defendant has a dominant strategy of introducing no evidence. If
the evidence shows that X occurred, there is no point in presenting it; doing
so would either cause him to lose (if the plaintiff does not present the evi-
dence) or have no effect on the outcome (if the plaintiff does present it)—
and force him to incur presentation costs. Better, in either event, to save the
costs of presenting the evidence. If, instead, the evidence shows X did not
occur, there is also no point in introducing it: he will win on the issue
whether or not the evidence is introduced (since the plaintiff has the burden
of proof), so again he may as well save the costs of presenting it. No matter
what strategy the plaintiff follows, then, the defendant will present no evi-
dence.
Now consider what the plaintiff will do, given this strategy of the defen-
dant’s. If the evidence shows X occurred, the plaintiff will present the evi-
dence: she cannot rely on the defendant to present the evidence, and if no
one presents it she will lose on the issue. If, instead, the evidence shows X
did not occur, there is no point in presenting the evidence—doing so would
bring defeat on herself and saddle her with presentation costs to boot. Thus,
the above strategy proﬁle constitutes the unique equilibrium when the plain-
tiff has the burden of proof.
A similar analysis shows that, if the defendant has the burden of proof,
the parties will pursue the following strategies in equilibrium:
The plaintiff presents no evidence on whether X occurred.
The defendant presents the evidence if and only if it indicates X did not occur.418 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
The intuition here is the same as in the previous case, except that the par-
ties’ roles are reversed. The plaintiff has no reason to incur the cost of pre-
senting the evidence, whether or not it shows X occurred—since in either
event presenting it will have no effect on the outcome of the case. The de-
fendant will accordingly want to present the evidence if it supports his posi-
tion, but not otherwise.
In summary, then, under either burden of proof assignment, the party
with the burden will present the evidence if and only if the evidence sup-
ports his position, while the other party will refrain from presenting evi-
dence regardless of whether the evidence supports his position.
9
IV. Optimal Burden Assignments
A. The Basic Model
We turn now to the optimal assignment of the burden of proof. Our ob-
jective is to examine how the court may use the burden of proof to econo-
mize on the transmission of information in litigation. Let us suppose that
the court wants to assign the burden of proof to minimize the expected costs
of presenting evidence on whether X occurred. Then the court should give
the plaintiff the burden if the following expression holds:
probability plaintiff’s costs probability defendant’s costs
that X 3 of showing X , that X did 3 of showing X did . (1)
occurred occurred not occur not occur
This follows from our analysis of the parties’ equilibrium behavior. As we
have seen, the plaintiff will present the evidence (given the burden of proof)
if and only if it establishes that X occurred. Thus, the left-hand box indi-
cates the expected costs of giving the burden to the plaintiff. Similarly, the
9 In this model the court has committed itself in advance to a given burden of proof assign-
ment. One might ask what would happen if, alternatively, the court were a player in this
game and decided cases according to its posterior beliefs (given the parties’ actions in the
litigation) about whether X occurred. Interestingly, the strategies just described are equilib-
rium outcomes in this game as well. For example, if the parties believe that the court will
rule for the plaintiff in the event no evidence is introduced, then the defendant will present
evidence if and only if the evidence favors him. Accordingly, if no evidence were introduced,
the court would infer that the evidence favored the plaintiff and would rationally rule for the
plaintiff. In this way, the strategies described in the text may arise endogenously in a three-
player version of the game. One way of viewing burden of proof rules, therefore, is as a
mechanism for selecting between different Nash equilibria. We explore this point in more
detail in a previous version of this paper. See Bruce L. Hay and Kathryn E. Spier, ‘‘The
Economics of the Burden of Proof’’ (unpublished manuscript, April 1994).BURDENS OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION 419
right-hand box indicates the expected costs of assigning the burden to the
defendant.
As (1) shows, two basic factors determine the optimal assignment in this
setting.
10 Let us consider them in turn.
1. Parties’ Costs
The ﬁrst factor is the parties’ relative costs of gathering and presenting
evidence on the contested issue. One party may have easier access to evi-
dence than his opponent, meaning he can assemble the appropriate evidence
at lower cost than his opponent. Other things being equal, the lower one
party’s relative costs, the stronger the argument for giving him the burden
of proof.
This question is complicated by the existence of discovery rules, which
enable each party to demand the evidence in the other’s possession. But
discovery does not render irrelevant the question of relative presentation
costs because the costs of discovery should be counted as presentation
costs. Suppose, for example, that the defendant has exclusive possession of
relevant evidence. Giving the plaintiff the burden of proof may lead her to
demand, and sift through, piles of information that may or may not contain
useful evidence—generating costs that might be avoided if the defendant
were given the burden of proof.
11 Determining the parties’ relative costs
thus requires the court to decide who initially possesses what evidence and
how costly and effective the discovery process is.
2. Probabilities
The court begins with some information Y about the case; we will call Y
the ‘‘signal’’ the court has received about whether X occurred. Given Y, the
probability that X occurred is as follows:
prob(X|Y) 3 prob(X)
prob(Y)
; (2)
10 These factors are widely recognized as the essential ones in assigning the burden of
proof on an issue. See, for example, James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf, at 344-49 (cited in note
4).
11 Here we have in mind a setting in which the defendant, but not the plaintiff, knows
which ﬁles (or which witnesses’ memories) contain useful evidence. Since the plaintiff will
not believe a defendant’s claim that a certain ﬁle is a dry well, she may rationally demand
it and search through it—though it may indeed turn out to be a dry well.420 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
similarly, the probability that X did not occur is
prob(Y|,X) 3 prob(,X)
prob(Y)
. (3)
Intheseexpressions,whicharederivedfrom Bayes’Rule, prob(X)represents
the unconditional likelihood that X will occur;12 prob(,X) represents the
unconditional likelihood that X will not occur; prob(Y|X) is the likelihood
the court would observe Y if X were to occur; prob(Y|,X) is the likelihood
the court would observe Y if X were not to occur; and prob(Y) is the uncon-
ditional likelihood of observing Y. For purposes of deciding whether (1)
holds, what matters is the two terms in the numerators of these expressions.
Begin with the term prob(X) in expressions (2) and (3). This term in ef-
fect represents how frequently X occurs. The less frequently X occurs, the
less likely that it occurred in this case. For example, suppose the case is a
medical malpractice suit arising out of an unsuccessful surgical operation.
Assume that
X ; surgeon’s failure to exercise due care.
If surgeon carelessness is a highly infrequent event, then—all else being
equal—the court should believe that it probably did not occur in this case.
(We will see below how all other things may not be equal.) Conversely, if
surgeons are frequently careless, then—again, all else being equal—the
court should conclude that the surgeon was probably careless in this case.
Now consider the terms prob(Y|X) and prob(Y|,X). Their relative mag-
nitude tells us, in effect, how much information can be gleaned from know-
ing that Y occurred. On the one hand, if prob(Y|X) is a lot greater than
prob(Y|,X), then observing Y is a good indication that X occurred. For ex-
ample, suppose that, in our malpractice example,
Y ; a surgical implement is left inside the patient.
For purposes of this example let us assume that a careful surgeon would
virtually never leave a surgical implement inside a patient, while a careless
surgeon might well do so. Observing that an implement was left in the pa-
tient in this particular case is then a strong indication that the surgeon was
negligent.
On the other hand, if prob(Y|X) is not much greater than prob(Y|,X),
12 For example, if X refers to negligent driving, prob(X) is the likelihood that motorists
drive negligently.BURDENS OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION 421
then not much information can be gleaned from Y’s occurrence. In our ex-
ample, suppose only that
Y ; unsuccessful operation.
Let us assume that the operation in question often fails even when the doc-
tor performs it carefully (though failure is more likely if the doctor is care-
less). Observing that the operation was unsuccessful in this case is not a
strong indication that the doctor was negligent since the operation might
well have failed even if the doctor had been careful.
B. Reﬁnements to the Basic Model
1. The Possibility of Settlement
Suppose the parties can settle out of court without gathering or present-
ing any evidence to the court. This is what we would expect in cases where
the parties are (as we have assumed) symmetrically informed about the evi-
dence. Does the burden of proof assignment matter (in the sense of affect-
ing the costs of litigation) in such instances? If so, do the prescriptions of
the basic model apply to these cases?
The main effect of the burden assignment in such cases is to determine
the size of the surplus from settling the case. Anytime there is a range of
possible settlement amounts, there is the possibility of a costly bargaining
process, in which each party attempts to capture as large a share of the sur-
plus as possible; from a social standpoint, such bargaining investments rep-
resent a deadweight loss. In a world where cases settle, the burden assign-
ment may (by establishing the size of the settlement surplus) inﬂuence the
amount expended on bargaining.13
While we do not model this matter formally, the intuition can be ex-
pressed quite simply. Take a case in which X has in fact occurred. As our
analysis of the parties’ equilibrium litigation strategies showed, evidence
will be presented (in the event of trial) if the plaintiff, but not if the defen-
dant, has the burden. Thus, putting the burden on the plaintiff in this case
has the effect of creating a settlement surplus—namely, the plaintiff’s pre-
sentation costs; to settle, the parties must agree on a division of that surplus,
which may consume bargaining resources. This deadweight loss would be
avoided, in this example, if the defendant had the burden of proof. (By anal-
13 For elaboration of this point, see Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 Ind
L J (1997, in press).422 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
ogy, if X has in fact not occurred, giving the defendant the burden creates
a deadweight loss that could be avoided by giving the plaintiff the burden.)
What is the best assignment, given that the court does not know whether
X occurred? The court wants to assign the burden in a way that minimizes
expected bargaining costs. We have the following result: if the resources
consumed in settlement bargaining in a given case increase (in a linear fash-
ion) as the settlement surplus increases, then the court’s problem is the
same as in the basic model; it achieves its objective by choosing the assign-
ment that minimizes expected presentation costs (the costs that would be
expended if the case failed to settle). If, however, bargaining costs do not
vary in a linear fashion with the size of the surplus, the court’s optimal as-
signment in a world of settlement will not necessarily be the same as in the
basic model.
2. Drawing Inferences from Parties’ Litigation Decisions
The court’s information set at the time it assigns the burden, Y, includes
the fact that the plaintiff has chosen to sue the defendant. But the plaintiff
would not waste her time bringing a suit she expected to lose, and if X did
not occur, the verdict will be against her no matter how the burden is as-
signed.
14 One might argue, therefore, that Y (the fact that suit was brought)
is a strong indication that X occurred. Should not the court then conclude,
from the fact suit was brought, that prob(X|Y) is large?
This reasoning overlooks that the plaintiff might sometimes bring a non-
meritorious claim in the hopes of extracting a settlement from the defen-
dant. In particular, if the defendant bears the burden of proof, he will be
willing to pay a positive amount to settle the case, in order to avoid the
costs of proving that X did not occur. The plaintiff, knowing this, may ratio-
nally choose to sue regardless of the merit of her claim. Accordingly, the
plaintiff’s decision to sue is not necessarily a strong indication that X oc-
curred.
15
3. Assignment’s Effect on Primary Behavior
If X is an action by one of the parties, then it might be asked whether its
occurrence is affected by how the burden is assigned. Suppose, to return to
14 This is clear from our analysis of the parties’ equilibrium litigation strategies. Assume
X did not occur. If the plaintiff has the burden, she will present no evidence and lose the
case. If the defendant has the burden, he will present the evidence and win the case.
15 A similar argument shows that the defendant’s decision to deny that X occurred is not
necessarily a good signal of whether X occurred.
Steven Shavell has recently investigated an analogous problem in the context of appeals—
namely, whether a court, in deciding whether an appeal is meritorious, should draw infer-
ences from the fact that it was brought. See his article, The Appeals Process as a Means of
Error Correction, 24 J Legal Stud 379, 412 (1995).BURDENS OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION 423
our example, that X 5 negligent behavior. Might not the defendant’s deci-
sion whether to comply with the standard of care depend on who has the
burden of proof?
Interestingly, if our simplifying assumptions about the litigation hold,
16
we get the following result. If the standard of care is efﬁcient, then the bur-
den of proof assignment will not affect the defendant’s decision to take
care. (By ‘‘efﬁcient’’ we mean that, at the margin, the costs of precautions
are less than the reduction in expected harm to the plaintiff.) We leave a
demonstration of this point to the Appendix; the basic intuition is simple.
From our analysis of the parties’ strategies in equilibrium, we know that
the defendant will (no matter who has the burden) be held liable if negli-
gent, and not otherwise. But if the standard of care is efﬁcient, the threat
of liability will be enough to induce him to take care. In equilibrium, then,
we would normally expect the defendant to (have an incentive to) take care
regardless of how the burden is assigned.
Now, this result depends on the assumption that the standard of care is
efﬁcient (as well as on the other simplifying assumptions of the model). If
these assumptions do not hold, there is no way of showing a priori that the
burden of proof has no effect on the defendant’s decision to take care. We
make no claim about the extent to which, in reality, the assignment of the
burden of proof affects actors’ primary behavior. To the extent it does not
have any such effect, however, two consequences follow. First, in searching
for the optimal burden of proof, the court can focus on the burden’s effect
on litigation costs; it need not worry that the assignment will affect other
social costs, such as the accident rate. Second, in evaluating (2) and (3), the
court can treat prob(X) as being an independent variable, not inﬂuenced by
the burden assignment.
V. The Burden of Proof in Practice
How well does the basic model comport with burden of proof assign-
ments actually made by courts? We can restate the prescription of the basic
model as follows. Plugging (2) and (3) into (1) and simplifying, we see that
(1) is satisﬁed if and only if
prob(Y|X) 3 prob(X) 3 plaintiff’s costs
, prob(Y|,X) 3 prob(,X) 3 defendant’s costs.
(4)
The basic model states that the court should give the plaintiff the burden of
proof if (4) holds, but not otherwise.
16 That the parties are symmetrically informed and the cost of presenting evidence is low
in relation to the stakes.424 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
We want to know how well this holds up as a description of what courts
do in practice. In rough terms, the following seems a fair characterization
of existing practices. (a) As a general rule, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof on most contested issues. There is, in a manner of speaking, a ‘‘pre-
sumption’’ that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on most factual issues
in the litigation. (b) There are, however, a number of instances in which the
defendant is given the burden of proof on a given issue. Though we do not
examine this matter exhaustively, we think the model is consistent with
both the general rule and some major exceptions.
A. The General Rule
A striking feature of judicial practice is that, in cases that go to court, the
burden of proof is seldom put in question. On most contested issues in most
cases, the plaintiff does not even bother disputing that she bears the burden
of proof. This is presumably because courts only reluctantly entertain argu-
ments for giving the defendant the burden of proof. To what extent is ex-
pression (4) consistent with a general rule that the plaintiff gets the burden
of proof?
Let us suppose the court wanted to establish a presumption (or default
rule) that the burden of proof rests on one party on all issues in all cases.
That is, suppose it wanted to say the burden always rests on one party, un-
less the circumstances clearly warranted giving it to the other party. (The
rationale for such a presumption, of course, would be to limit the resources
expended on litigating the question of who should bear the burden of proof
in a given case.) Who would get the burden under this default rule?
Expression (4) suggests that the following conditions, if satisﬁed, would
justify giving the burden to the plaintiff:
i) in general, the plaintiff’s costs of gathering and presenting evidence on a con-
tested issue are not substantially greater than the defendant’s; and
ii) actors generally comply with the law, regardless of how the burden of proof is
assigned; thus, if X refers to some sort of ‘‘wrongdoing’’ (commission of a tort,
breach of contract, and so on), prob(X) is relatively low; and
iii) prob(Y|,X) is not too low, that is, the signal received by the court (before
assigning the burden) has a possible ‘‘innocent’’ explanation, in the following
sense: the signal might have been received even if the defendant had complied
with the law.
We conjecture that these conditions are often met in practice—or more pre-
cisely, that courts might plausibly believe they are met in practice. Regard-
ing i, it is reasonable to assume that, given the availability of discovery,
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always be so. Regarding ii, it seems safe to assume that much of the time,
the threat of liability (along with other forces) induces actors to comply
with applicable standards of tort law, contract law, and so forth.
If we grant those two assumptions, then condition iii is relatively easy to
satisfy. A numerical illustration may help make the point. Let us suppose
that the plaintiff’s costs of gathering and presenting evidence are 50 percent
higher than the defendant’s, and let us suppose that actors comply with the
applicable standard of care 90 percent of the time.17 Plugging this informa-
tion into (4), we see that the plaintiff should have the burden of proof if
prob(Y|X) 3 .1 3 1.5 , prob(Y|,X) 3 .9,
that is,
prob(Y|X) , 6 3 prob(Y|,X).
Thus, the court should give the plaintiff the burden unless noncompliance
with the law is six times more likely (than compliance is) to send the ‘‘sig-
nal’’ received by the court. The upshot is that, unless Y is a fairly reliable
signal of whether X occurred, conditions i and ii are enough to warrant giv-
ing the burden to the plaintiff.
B. Exceptions
Where exceptions to the general rule are made, we would expect to see
them in situations where the plaintiff’s costs are a lot greater than the de-
fendant’s, where prob(Y|X) is a lot greater than prob(Y|,X), or where the
frequency of X is very large. Let us consider some of the major exceptions.
1. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Courts invoke this principle to give the defendant the burden of proof on
the issue of his own negligence, in cases involving accidents that generally
result from negligence.
18 (Our earlier malpractice example, involving a sur-
gical implement left inside a patient, is a characteristic occasion for invok-
ing the doctrine.)19 Similarly, in product liability suits, the doctrine is used
to give the defendant the burden of proving that the product causing injury
was not defective, when the accident in question generally results from de-
17 Thus, prob(X) 5 .1.
18 Numerous instances of the doctrine’s application are collected in Fowler V. Harper,
Fleming James, and Oscar Gray, 4 The Law of Torts 21-84 (2d ed 1986); and Wigmore, at
487-511 (cited in note 1).
19 See, for example, Hestbeck v Hennepin County, 297 Minn 419, 212 NW2d 361 (1973).426 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
fective products.
20 Consider, for example, in such cases, prob(Y|X) is much
higher than prob(Y|,X). In deciding whether to apply the rule, some courts
also ask whether the defendant had ‘‘exclusive’’ control over the instru-
mentality that the caused the injury; this might be justiﬁed on the grounds
that exclusive control implies the defendant has greater access to evidence
of what happened.
21 Res ipsa is, then, quite easy to square with expres-
sion (4).
2. Presumptions
Courts often presume the truth of a factual statement that is almost al-
ways true.
22 Consider, for example, the presumption that a letter or telegram
reaches its designated addressee; that a person inexplicably absent from
home for 7 years is deceased; that the presumption (in insurance coverage
cases) that a sudden death is the product of accident rather than suicide;
that the maker of a will is sane.
23 Or consider the presumption that the price
an investor pays for a security is inﬂuenced by accountants’ opinion letters
and the like.
24 In these instances prob(X) is high, so the defendant is given
the burden of producing supporting evidence that it did not occur.
25
Other presumptions are justiﬁed by differentials in the parties’ costs of
gathering and producing evidence. Consider, for example, the presumption
that damage to goods in a bailee’s possession was caused by the bailee’s
negligence, or the presumption that the driver of another person’s auto is
acting as the owner’s agent.
26 Evidence about what happened to the dam-
aged goods, or about the relation between the driver and the owner, is more
20 Consider the famous line of cases involving exploding soft drink bottles (for example,
Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co of Fresno, 24 Cal2d 453, 150 P2d 436 (1944)). Other exam-
ples are collected in the works cited in note 18 above.
21 See Harper, James, and Gray, at 45-47 (cited in note 18), for examples. Exclusive con-
trol also increases the value of prob(X|Y) since it makes less likely the hypothesis that some-
one else’s negligence injured the plaintiff.
22 ‘‘A presumption upon a matter of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for some other
principle, means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that courts
may notice the truth.’’ Greer v United States, 245 US 559, 561 (1918) (Holmes, J).
23 These examples are drawn from Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evi-
dence under the Rules 754-55 (2d ed 1993); and James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf, at 348 (cited
in note 4).
24 See, for example, Sharp v Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F2d 175 (3d Cir 1981).
25 An interesting example in this regard is the court’s ruling in Johnson v Austin, 406 Mich
420, 280 NW2d 9 (Mich 1979), creating a presumption that hit-and-run drivers have behaved
negligently in causing the accident. The court’s rationale that only a driver who had been
negligent (and feared being held liable) would expose himself to a prison term on a hit-and-
run charge.
26 These examples are drawn from James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf, at 349 (cited in note 4).BURDENS OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION 427
accessible to the defendant, rendering his costs lower. Another example is
the general rule that the taxpayer bears the burden of proof in income tax
deﬁciency actions brought in the tax court by the Internal Revenue Service.
Though the IRS is the plaintiff, the taxpayer is given the burden of proof
because he has greater access to evidence concerning his ﬁnancial affairs.27
3. Prima Facie Cases
Courts sometimes shift the burden of proof to the defendant on a ‘‘prima
facie’’ showing by the plaintiff that X occurred. A well-known instance is
found in Title VII antidiscrimination litigation. Suppose the court wants to
know whether a group of female employees was discharged for discrimina-
tory reasons. Roughly speaking, if the plaintiffs can show they were treated
differently from a group of similarly situated male employees, the defen-
dant must come forward with evidence that the plaintiff was not ﬁred for
discriminatory reasons.28 In such a setting, prob(Y|X) is relatively high
compared to prob(Y|,X); in addition, the employer has lower costs of pro-
ducing evidence on the motive for the discharge.
Similar considerations are at work in the doctrine of ‘‘negligence per
se,’’ which (in one version) holds that the violator of a safety ordinance
is presumed to have acted negligently; once the defendant is shown to
have violated the ordinance, he must come forward with evidence he exer-
cised due care.
29 Here again, prob(Y|X) is relatively high compared to
prob(Y|,X), making it sensible to require the defendant to show that Y (vi-
olation of the ordinance) was not in fact produced by X (negligence).
4. Afﬁrmative Defenses
Courts sometimes shift the burden of proof on a given issue to the defen-
dant by labeling his position on the issue an ‘‘afﬁrmative defense.’’ Certain
major examples seem consonant with the basic model. For instance, courts
typically require the defendant to produce evidence to support his position
that the plaintiff assumed the risk in a negligence case;
30 one rationale may
27 See, for example, Portillo v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 932 F2d 1128, 1133
(5th Cir 1991).
28 See, for example, Texas Dept of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248 (1981).
29 See, for example, Delﬁno v Sloan, 20 Cal App 4th 1429, 25 Cal Rptr 2d 265 (1994);
Bowen v Baumgardner, 6 Wash App 18, 491 P2d 1301 (Wash App 1971). Another version
of the doctrine holds that violation of the statute itself constitutes negligence, rather than just
shifting the burden of proof on the question of negligence.
30 See, for example, William L. Prosser and W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts 494 (5th ed 1984).428 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
be that prob(X) is very high (X 5 victims not assuming risk) since individu-
als rarely willingly expose themselves to negligently created risks.
Other examples seem explicable by the parties’ relative costs. In a tort
suit, the defendant generally has the burden of proving his position that he
was released from liability by a previous settlement of the dispute. It is pre-
sumably far easier for the defendant to prove the fact that a case was settled
(by producing a written release) than for the plaintiff to prove it was not.
Similar considerations explain why, in a suit to collect payment on a debt,
the defendant has the burden of proving he has already paid the debt (it is
easy to produce a receipt).
A more interesting example is the issue of contributory negligence in tort
suits. The issue arises frequently, yet courts are divided on who should bear
the burden on the issue.31 Why might this be?
One reason, we conjecture, is that whether (4) is satisﬁed depends in part
onthe orderin which issues are adjudicated ina case (moreprecisely, the or-
der in which evidence is presented). Consider two possibilities: in one sce-
nario, the court adjudicates simultaneously the issues of the defendant’s care
and the plaintiff’s care; in the otherscenario, it ﬁrst considers the defendant’s
care and then (if evidence of defendant negligence is presented) considers
the plaintiff’s care. In the latterscenario, the court—at the time it adjudicates
the issue of the plaintiff’s care—has greater reason to believe the plaintiff
was careful (see Figure 1).32 Thus, when the issues are litigated sequentially,
the argument for giving the defendant the burden of proof is stronger.
The division in the courts may reﬂect disagreement over whether the par-
ties’ respective care is generally litigated simultaneously or sequentially. In
some instances it makes little sense to examine the issues sequentially—
when, for example, the same witnesses observed both parties’ levels of
care, it may be most economical to have them testify on both issues at once.
In other instances, the evidentiary materials on each issue may be quite sep-
arate, so that it makes most sense to examine the issues sequentially.
33 The
appropriate burden of proof rule (assuming a single rule is to govern both
situations)
34 might then depend on which occurred more frequently.
35
31 See, for example, the cases collected in Wigmore, at 479-83 (cited in note 1).
32 At the beginning of the litigation, the case (for all the court knows) may lie anywhere
in the two circles in Figure 1. Once the court knows the defendant has been negligent, it can
rule out all nonoverlapping portions of the left-hand circle—meaning it is less probable (than
before) that the case in fact lies in the left-hand circle.
33 For an analysis of related problems, see William M. Landes, Sequential vs. Unitary Tri-
als: An Economic Analysis, 22 J Legal Stud 99 (1993).
34 Courts could, of course, make the assignment on a case-by-case basis, depending on
how the issues would be litigated. As noted above, though, case-by-case determination of the
burden of proof has costs of its own.
35 The orthodox rule in the nineteenth century was to put the burden on the plaintiff; the
modern trend is increasingly to put the burden on the defendant. See, for example, Harper,BURDENS OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION 429
Figure 1.—Distribution of negligence cases. Once it is established that the case falls in
one circle, the likelihood that it is in the other circle drops.
VI. Concluding Remark: The Choice between Adversarial
and Inquisitorial Systems
We have tried to show how, properly employed, the burden of proof as-
signment may minimize the expected costs of resolving a lawsuit. In our
analysis, we have assumed that the court operates within the conﬁnes of the
adversary system, meaning that it relies on the parties to gather and present
evidence. Our analysis also gives some insight on the advantages of an ad-
versary system in comparison to an inquisitorial system, in which the court
(or an agency with adjudicative responsibilities) must gather the relevant
evidence itself.
Let us suppose that expression (4) holds, so that giving the burden of
proof to the plaintiff is preferable to giving it to the defendant on the ques-
tion whether X occurred in a given case. Assume now that the court can
choose between either (i) conducting its own investigation of the matter by
gathering evidence on X’s occurrence, or (ii) giving the plaintiff the burden
of proof. The latter alternative generates lower litigation costs if the follow-
ing holds:
James, and Gray, at 347-51 (cited in note 18). Perhaps one explanation is that, in contempo-
rary accident cases, the defendant’s conduct is frequently separate (in temporal and spatial
terms) from the plaintiff’s, so that the evidence on each is also separate. Consider, for exam-
ple, a product liability case, in which manufacture and use of a product are quite distinct
events; evidence about one does not say much about the other. (Other explanations for the
modern trend of course include the unpopularity of denying compensation to victims of negli-
gent defendants simply because they themselves have acted negligently—a sentiment re-
ﬂected, for example, in the widespread adoption of comparative negligence rules.)430 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
probability plaintiff’s costs court’s costs of gathering
that X 3 of showing X , evidence of whether X . (5)
occurred occurred occurred
The difference in the two boxes arises because we have assumed that the
plaintiff, but not the court, knows what the evidence contains. As a result,
if the plaintiff is given the burden of proof, evidence is presented only if
(the evidence shows that) X occurred; in contrast, if the court takes the task
on itself, it gathers evidence whether or not X occurred.
Expression (5) suggests that the adversary system is likely to produce
lower litigation costs unless the court’s costs of gathering evidence are con-
siderably lower than the plaintiff’s costs of doing so.
36 (This might be the
case if the court has superior access to the evidence, or if the conten-
tiousness of litigation in an adversary system has the effect of generating
high costs for the party with the burden of proof.)
37 An interesting question
is whether (5) explains patterns actually encountered in practice. We leave
this issue for future research.
APPENDIX
The Burden of Proof and Primary Behavior
Here we develop the claim advanced in Section IVB3 of the text. Deﬁne the
following notation:
k 5 cost of taking care;
pH 5 probability of accident if the defendant takes care;
pL 5 probability of accident if the defendant does not take care;
j 5 plaintiff’s losses from an accident;
c 5 a party’s cost of presenting evidence (assumed the same for each party).
36 Shavell’s study of appeals makes a similar point about court review of lower court deci-
sions. Rather than automatically reviewing all judgments, it is preferable for the appellate
court to force disappointed litigants to come forward (at some cost to themselves) when an
error has occurred. In this fashion, the court (assuming its objective is to correct errors)
avoids wasting error resources by reviewing decisions that are correct. See Shavell, cited at
note 14.
37 Points commonly raised against the adversarial system are that (1) it invites foot drag-
ging and abusive tactics by the adversaries, and (2) it encourages the manipulation or mis-
leading use of evidence. See, for example, John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in
Civil Procedure, 52 U Chi L Rev 823 (1985). Both of these features might have the effect
of raising the costs of the party with the burden of proof. (Suppose, for example, that the
other party attempts to cloud the litigation with the introduction of unreliable evidence, which
the party with the burden of proof must expend effort to refute.)BURDENS OF PROOF IN CIVIL LITIGATION 431
We assume that taking care is efﬁcient, meaning
k , (pL 2 pH)j, (A1)
and also that
c , j. (A2)
Suppose the plaintiff has the burden of proof. Then she will present evidence if
injured by the defendant’s negligent conduct. The defendant’s cost of acting negli-
gently is thus pLj. The defendant, accordingly, will take care if
k , pL j, (A3)
which is true anytime (A1) holds.
Suppose, instead, that the defendant has the burden of proof. If he is negligent,
he will be held liable in the event of injury; if he is careful, he will not be held
liable (though he may bear the costs of proving he was not negligent). He will act
carefully if
k 1 pHc , pL j; (A4)
it is easily veriﬁed that this too holds anytime (A1) and (A2) both hold.